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aBStract
This article looks at some of the characteristics, causes and consequences 
of the present day migrations from the southern Mediterranean countries to 
Western Europe, concentrating on the three Maghrebi countries, Tunisia, Algeria 
and Morocco, especially the latter. The most detailed sections will zoom in 
further to look at the vortex of this migration – the Strait which bears the name 
of Gibril Tarik, who crossed it with an army of 7,000 in 712 D.C. to conquer the 
southern Iberian peninsular and to found the civilization of Andalus and which 
today forms both a passage and a barrier between the world wealth and the 
world of poverty.
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reSumen
Este artículo explora algunas de las características, causas y consecuencias 
de las migraciones actuales desde los países del sur del Mediterráneo hacia 
Europa Occidental, concentrándose en los tres países magrebíes: Túnez, Argelia 
y Marruecos (particularmente en este último). Las secciones más detalladas se 
centrarán en el vórtice de estas migraciones: el estrecho que lleva el nombre de 
Gibril Tarik, quien lo cruzó con una armada de 7.000 soldados en el año 712 
d.C. para conquistar el sur de la Península Ibérica y para fundar la civilización 
de Al Andalus; que hoy en día constituye tanto una vía como una barrera entre 
el mundo libre y el mundo pobre.
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1 . introduction1
Members of the species to which the authors, readers and subjects of 
this special issue of Revista de Economía Mundial belong first migrated as 
far as the northern coast of Africa at least 60,000 years ago. Recent fossil 
evidence proves that 30,000 years ago there were members of our species in 
central Europe. Other hominids had crossed to the European shore 100,000 
or more years before that. The history of trans-Mediterranean migrations of 
modern humans alone would fill an encyclopaedia. This article is a tiny entry 
in that encyclopaedia and looks at some of the characteristics, causes and 
consequences of the present day migrations from the southern Mediterranean 
countries to Western Europe, concentrating on the three Maghrebi countries, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, especially the latter; the most detailed sections 
will zoom in further to look at the vortex of this migration – the Strait which 
bears the name of Gibril Tarik, who crossed it with an army of 7,000 in 712 
A.D. to conquer the southern Iberian peninsular and to found the civilization 
of Andalus.
This is the place, once better known as the Pillars or Gates of Hercules, 
where the Mediterranean joins the Atlantic ocean and where the continents 
of Europe and Africa almost kiss. According to mythology, this gap, at its 
narrowest only a dozen kilometres wide, was created when Hercules, rather 
than pass over the mountain at the Western end of the Mediterranean (formed 
when Perseus had turned the giant Atlas to stone by showing him the head of 
the gorgon Medusa), simply smashed it with his sword, thus separating the 
continents of Europe and Africa and opening what would become in our own 
1 I have taken the liberty of borrowing without permission the title of this article from a novel quoted 
by Mara Leichtman in her sensitive and informative article ‘Transforming Brain Drain into Capital Gain: 
Changing Relationship with Migration and Remittances’. The story’s hero must accumulate money to 
pay a dowry and marry his love Zulicha. There being no work for him in Algeria, ‘there did not remain 
a path for ‘Abid to follow to win Zulicha, except the path of the sea’. (The Price of the Dowry by ‘Abd 
al-Hamid ben Hadduga).
I am especially grateful for comments by Andrew Glyn and Arthur MacEwan and also for the comments 
of two anonymous referees.
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day one of the hottest spots along the global frontier between wealth and 
poverty, power and subordination. The details of these stories are empirically 
rather shaky; but so also are those relating to the subject of this article. While 
South to North migration is not mythical it does generate many myths.
photo 1: the gateS of herculeS (looking eaSt)
2 . the numBer of tranS-mediterranean migrantS
Wherever there is immigration estimates of the numbers of people involved 
vary greatly and are manipulated with political motives. These variations exist 
not only as prejudices of the newspaper-reading public but also in official and 
semi-official sources of statistics. There is no authoritative and accurate source 
for the number of immigrants.
Recently published estimates vary between the unofficial one of a French 
historian, specializing in the Mahgreb, who argues that 10–15 million people 
of Mahgrebi origin are currently resident in Europe (5–7 millions being 
Moroccans) (Vermeren 2002, 17) and the more official ones of the OECD/
SOPEMI which imply that no more than 3 million Mahgrebis (including 1. 5 
million Moroccans) were resident in Europe in 2002 (these figures combine 
resident Mahgrebi nationals with the sum of Mahgrebis who have obtained 
citizenship of a European country during the ten years prior to 2002) (See 
OECD/SOPEMI 2005). The maximum estimates of the Mahgrebi part of trans-
Mediterranean migration to Europe are, therefore, as much as five times as 
great as the minimum ones.
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In the face of such a huge discrepancy an article on this subject must 
begin with some commentary on the reasons why estimates are so different 
and at least suggest a range for the actual numbers of people involved. The 
first problem here is whether a count of immigrants includes those who 
are nationals of a particular country of origin or those who were born in it. 
European countries tend to count foreign nationals while North American 
and Australasian countries tend to count the foreign born, although European 
countries are increasingly publishing estimates of both. In the case studies 
here the difference between the two is due to three factors (referring to the 
country of residence as CR and that of origin as CO):
- some former colonial settlers from CR, were born in the CO when it was 
a colony but were always nationals of the colonialist country and now live 
there;
- some immigrants from CO to CR were born in CO but are now after 
naturalization citizens of CR;
- some children of nationals of CO in CR were born in CR but are nationals 
of CO.
In the case of contemporary South to North migration, figures of people 
born in countries of the South tend to exceed figures of nationals of those 
countries. In France, where it is easy from the census to distinguish the two, the 
number of Algerian nationals in France was calculated as 777,332 compared 
with 1,254,706 Algerian born; for Morocco the equivalent figures are 633,731 
and 709,521 and for Tunisia 224,096 and 340,752. These figures include 
French colonists born in North Africa before 1962.
A second problem is whether, instead of calculating numbers of foreign 
nationals or foreign born, to estimate those with “origins” in a particular country. 
This is commonly done by those who see migration not so much of individuals 
as of cultures or the creation of diasporas. According to this concept, some 
people who are neither born in nor citizens of a given country may be counted 
as part of the expatriate community (diaspora) of that country as a result of 
descent and ethnic or cultural ties. The Fondation Hassan II, a Moroccan state 
organization charged with maintaining relations with Marocains Résidant a 
l’Étranger (MREs), has in recent years published estimates of MREs in France 
ranging from 728,333 (probably Moroccan citizens plus naturalized French 
citizens of Moroccan origin) (Fondation Hassan II 2005) to 1,025,000 (2002 
estimate cited in Berriane 2005). If that last figure is anything more than a 
wild guess then it probably includes children of French nationality born to 
Moroccan parents in France. These gradations of Moroccanness are similar to 
the categories to which Mexican immigrants and their descendents are assiged 
in discussions of migration and assimilation in the USA. 
A third problem with many of these statistics is that official figures are for 
residents with permits and so they exclude the very category of people about 
whom information is most unreliable and who are in many ways at the centre 
of political debates and conflicts about migration and its future – immigrants 
without valid permits or papers to be in the country of residence. Estimates of 
numbers of non-permitted immigrants are extremely variable and unreliable. 
No government has a very clear idea of how many people are resident in 
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its country without its consent. Nor, of course, does anyone else. Some of 
the estimates used, however, such as those based on enumerations, or self-
registration, rather than on official permissions, include some, but not all non-
permitted residents.
A fourth problem regarding numbers arises because there are different 
official sources of data on immigrant numbers in the destination countries. 
In Spain, to give a notable example, there are three official estimates of the 
number of foreign residents and they give quite contrasting results. The last 
census at the end of 2001 (based on figures collected by the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística) suggested a total population for the country which was about one 
million (over 2 per cent) lower than the population given by adding up people 
on the municipal registers (padrones – compiled by municipal administrations) 
for the whole country. It has been widely believed that many of these were 
immigrants without permits. The Spanish government also publishes regular 
data on the number of immigrants with permits by nationality (supplied by 
the immigration department of the National Police). According to these, on 
31.12.2004 the total number of foreign residents in Spain was 1,977,291 
of which 386,958 were Moroccan nationals. According to provisional figures 
from the padrón municipal for 1.1.2005 there were 3,691,547 foreigners of 
whom 505,373 were Moroccan. If the padrón gives the right number then 
the statistical report on foreigners with residence permits underestimates the 
number of foreigners as a whole by 87 per cent, and Moroccans in particular 
by 30 per cent. There is much expert disagreement, however, about the 
accuracy of the padrón in relation to other figures. Many residents do not 
register themselves in the padrón; many others are registered more than once 
since their name is not automatically removed if they leave one locality and 
go to another or even leave the country. The evolution of these differences in 
Spain can be seen in Figures 1a and b. A major divergence has arisen in the last 
few years between the number of immigrants on the municipal registers and 
the number with permits. In 2005 the government decided that the municipal 
register was more accurate and that the difference between the two was to 
some extent a measure of illegal immigration in the country. As a response it 
launched the largest regularization programme in recent European history2.
2 The normalization period lasted from the 7th of February to the 9th of May 2005. During that 
time a total of 690,679 immigrants requested regularization. In principle all of these had jobs and 
were already registered in the municipal register (padrón). About 88 per cent of these (604,357) 
were allowed. Of the applications 58.76 per cent came from men and 41.24 per cent women. But 
the regularized immigrants will acquire rights to be joined by their families and will thus lead to a 
secondary flow of (possibly majority female) immigrants during the next 2 or 3 years. Four countries 
produced over 50,000 applications for regularization (in order, Ecuador, Rumania, Morocco and 
Colombia) and together accounted for about 60 per cent of the total. The Moroccan figure was 
85,969 (12.5 per cent of the total) (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2005). About two thirds 
of the women applicants were domestic workers. One third of the men were construction workers and 
one fifth worked in agriculture.
The balance of sexes was very different among these national collectives. A majority of Ecuadorean, 
Colombian, Bolivian and Ukrainian applications were women. The largest majority of men (about 
85 per cent) was registered for Morocco. This will increase the male proportion of legal Moroccan 
residents to something like 70 per cent.
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figure 1: different eStimateS of the numBer of all foreign and moroccan nationalS reSident in 
Spain, 1995–2005
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The scale of the 2005 Spanish regularization was astonishing and the 
government which carried it out has been both publicly praised by the United 
Nations Commission for Human Rights and privately chastised by neighbouring 
European governments. In three months three quarters of a million people (one 
and a half per cent of the population of the country), about whom the society 
was in a state of denial, came out into the light and were, at least for now, 
legalized. Some, it is alleged in the press, are really the illegal immigrants of 
other European countries who came to Spain because it was a soft touch. But 
these seem to have been few and many have been deported during the process. 
The Spanish regularization was larger in relative terms than the 2.7 million 
mostly Mexican illegal migrants (about 1 per cent of the US population) who 
were legalized in the USA in the aftermath of the IRCA act in 1986. Like Spain’s 
2005 legalization, the IRCA was supposed to be a once for all regularization 
followed by the strictest possible enforcement of the anti-immigration laws. 
But it is generally acknowledge in the USA that regularization was in fact the 
prelude to an acceleration in illegal migration and which has now left the US 
government (as it does the Spanish government) with a choice between denial, 
legalization and literally millions of forcible deportations. This is a subject to 
which I will return.
Meanwhile I attempt in Table 1 to produce a rough but servicable estimate 
of the size of trans-Mediterrean migration. The overall and comparative 
estimates in this table have several deficiencies, some but not all of them 
arising from the general problems discussed above. In the first place, while I 
have used the most recent available official national figures in the countries of 
residence, they are of different dates. The figures for France are for 1999 and 
those for Spain for 2005; the other countries lie between these two extremes. 
Second, different census methods are used for different figures, as already 
explained above. Third, many migrants without valid residence permits (the 
so-called “illegal migrants”) are not counted in these figures. We can be sure 
that the overall figures will be higher than those which appear here. But, fourth, 
at the same time there are other reasons why some of these figures are too 
high: for instance, people may be double-registered in the Spanish municipal 
register and some of those registered, as well as some people with valid 
residence permits, may have left the country of residence either temporarily or 
permanently. Fifthly, more people have obtained citizenship in the country of 
residence than are shown here, but on the other hand some of those included 
in the figures for naturalizations since 1992 will have died; the over- and under-
counting will to some extent cancel out.
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taBle 1: eStimateS of north african nationalS reSident aBroad pluS recently naturaliSed, recent 
date (thouSandS)
Country of origin 
 
Country of 
residence
Morocco Algeria Tunisia Mahgreb 3 Libya Egypt 5 North Africa % population of CR
Spain 569 (a) 46 (a) 1 (b) 616 0.2 (h) 2 (b) 618 1.5
France (c) 820 (1) 909 284 2,013   2,013 3.4
Belgium 233 (p)  (d) 5 254   254 2.4
Netherlands 273 (q) 1 (g) 1 (g) 275 0.1 (g) 8 (g) 283 1.7
Italy (o) 341 15 69 425 1 41 467 0.8
Germany (h) 80 17 24 121 3 14 139 0.2
Europe 6 2,316 1,003 385 3,704 5 67 3,777 1.4
         
% pop. in E6 7.7 3.2 3.9 5.2 0.1 0.1 2.6  
Other N. Afr. 199 (s)     333 (j)   
Saudi Arab. 12 (s)     924 (j)   
Other MidEast      657 (j)   
USA (m) 31 (r) 31 (r) 10 (r)  5 (r) 113 190  
Canada (n) 26 20 5  3 149 (m) 37  
% emigrant 9–11 3.5–4.5 4.0–5  0.1–0.2  3–4 2.3–3  
Sources: 
a. Spain, Padrón Municipal, 1.1.2005 2005 figs.
b. Spain, Extranjería March 2005.
c. France, 1999 Recensement.
d. SOPEMI 2004 edition (2005) 2002 figs.
e. Council of Europe 1999 figs.
 f. ditto 2000 figs.
g. ditto 2003 figs.
h. ditto 2002 figs.
i. Collyer/IOM (which cites Council of Europe 2001).
j. Harrell Bond and Zohry, 2003.
k. Salt, 2000.
l. Fondation Hassan II Atlas.
m. US Census Bureau 2005.
n. Canadastats 2005.
o. Italian National Census (Censimento) 31.12.2003.
p. Fondation Hassan II Ouvrage 2005, p. 94, excludes naturalized.
q. Fondation Hassan II Ouvrage 2005, p. 323, includes naturalized.
r. Estimates based on same relation between foreign birth and declared ancestry as Egypt.
s. See Table 1. This total does not include Moroccans naturalized in the Netherlands since they are 
included in the figure earlier in the column in this Table.
Notes:
1 First estimates from the 2004 update to the French census show that the number of Moroccan 
born residents has increased by about 10 per cent. This and other updatings could add perhaps 
100,000 to the total of Moroccan residents in Western Europe, the numbers for the other Magreb 
countries also rising a little. 
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Despite this long list of deficiencies Table 1 does give a blurred but not 
totally unrecognizable image of the size of trans-Mediterranean migration. 
Some number upwards of 3 million nationals of the five North African countries 
are resident in the European Union; this is about 2 per cent of the population 
of North Africa though less than one per cent of the population of the EU. 
Europe is the main area of reception of emigrants from Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya, so the figures of Table 1 are a relatively faithful picture of 
the overall emigration intensity of those countries. This is not true of Egypt for 
which the focus of emigration has not been towards Europe but towards the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf and, to a lesser extent, North America. It is emigration of 
a very different kind from that from the Maghreb to Europe, and this difference 
will be detailed later.
These aggregate estimates mean, if they are approximately correct, that 
the five North African countries as a whole have a somewhat lower rate of out-
migration, and a much lower level of in-migration than the world as a whole (see 
Introduction to this issue). Of course, when the figures are examined in greater 
detail they show different pictures. In the case of countries of origin Morocco 
shows greater migration intensity, having at least 9 per cent of the population 
of the country resident in other countries. At the end of 2003, according to 
the national census, Moroccans were the most numerous nationality of foreign 
legal residents in Spain with 20 per cent of all foreigners. On Jan 1 2005, 
according to the municipal register, Moroccans were still the largest single 
foreign nationality, with 1.15 per cent of the resident population and 13.7 per 
cent of the foreign population. They were very closely followed (and on present 
trends will soon be overtaken) by citizens of Ecuador. Nationals of the three 
Maghreb countries make up nearly 1.5 per cent of the population of France 
and nearly one per cent of that of Belgium. 
This attempt to compare, select and unite estimates of the numbers of 
North African emigrants demonstrates, first, that there is very great variation 
between the 5 countries. Algeria and Tunisia are countries with a significant 
number of their citizens or natives in Europe but they are not countries of large 
scale migration. Egyptian migration has been larger but is mostly not, as with 
the Maghrebian countries, towards Europe but towards North America and the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf. Libya is an oil producing country with relatively low out-
migration but is host to a significant number of immigrant workers. Morocco 
is the one country of the five with a very significant level of migration, highly 
concentrated in the Western European countries of the EU. Morocco, along 
with Tunisia and Libya, is also on a route of migration from sub-Saharan African 
countries. The numbers of sub-Saharan Africans in the three countries, either 
waiting to cross to Europe or having been returned from Europe, has not been 
estimated here because there seem to be no reliable indicators at all about 
how many people are in this position.
The great variation in numbers and destinations shows that a large number 
of different migration networks originate or pass through the five North African 
countries. Egypt is a source of both skilled and unskilled temporary workers to 
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the oil producing countries of the Gulf. Another axis of that migration network 
is analyzed by John Willoughby (in this issue). Some of the things he says about 
migration from India to the Gulf will be echoed in the experience of Egyptian 
migration to the Gulf, especially in relation to the growing unskilled portion of 
this migration. But it will not be further considered here.
The discussion of the numbers also reveals the very high levels of uncertainty 
which surround the estimates. Given that the figures for a given time are so 
unreliable, those which indicate trends over periods of time are perhaps even 
more unreliable. But some recent estimates of trends of Moroccan migration 
to 6 European countries are shown in Figure 2. These series are not necessarily 
consistent with the figures in Table 1 but they are are all based on series which 
internally use the same definitions; so they may be better indicators of trends 
than of actual numbers. Their message is that during the last decade and a half 
a strong upward trend in Italy and Spain contrasts with a stabilization or even 
slight decline in the number of Moroccan immigrants in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium. Since these figures are for residents of foreign nationality 
only, the low growth or decline in France, the Netherlands and Belgium is partly 
due to rising naturalizations.
figure 2: numBerS of moroccan reSidentS in 6 european countrieS, 1990–2004
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The uncertainty of these estimates, in its turn, is an indication of something 
more important about the nature of the migrations which we are observing: it is 
that they are to a great extent outside the control of the governments of both 
source and destination countries. Obversely, this means that they are flows 
and networks to a great extent controlled by the migrants who participate 
in them, individually and through their social groups (families, villages of 
origin, civil, political and religious organizations). The fact that no researcher 
or public body can say with any authority how many migrants there are is 
symptomatic of the fact that noone is in overall control of the process. It is, 
therefore, characterized by a situation of dual- or multiple-power in which, 
in the words of Stephen Castles (2004), “formal power of governments and 
bureaucracies is being subverted by the human agency embodied in networks 
and transnational communities” (also see Erdem 2006 in this issue). “Control” 
or “management” are the words which have come to dominate national and 
international debates about migration. International authorities suggest the 
need for “managed migration”, governments of destination countries are serial 
introducers of policies, all justified on their ability to control the number of 
migrants, and pressure is increasingly placed on source countries to control 
the outflow of their emigrants or transient populations. No sooner was the 
2005 Spanish regularization complete than it was declared by the government 
to be a prelude to a more rigorous enforcement of border controls and Spain 
agreed with 4 other European Union members to cooperate to keep Europe 
free of illegal migrants. But no such policies or exhortations have yet had much 
success.
 The North African country with the highest emigration propensity, Morocco, 
can be compared to some of the other emigrations described in this issue 
of the journal. At present, it is estimated that about 7 per cent of Mexican 
citizens reside in the USA; this is lower than the percentage of Moroccan 
citizens abroad (9–11 per cent). Given the long history of Mexican migration 
northwards, however, people with Mexican ancentry make up a much higher 
proportion of the US population than North Africans in any European country, 
aside from particular neighbourhoods in large cities. Like Mexicans in the USA, 
North Africans, especially Moroccans, in Europe tend to travel frequently 
between their country of residence and country of origin, and very often can be 
considered as people of dual residency. So, in both these cases, the idea that 
migration consists of a once for all flow from countries of origin to countries of 
destination is itself a considerable simplification. Turkish migration to Germany 
also shares some of these characteristics. About 6 per cent of the Turkish 
population is resident in Western Europe, and in Germany they make up nearly 
3 per cent of the resident population (see Erdem 2006 in this issue).
Indian migrants in the Gulf countries make up only a tiny proportion of 
the Indian population, although migrants from the state of Kerala in the Gulf 
are a little under 5 per cent of the population of their state and rather more 
than 5 per cent of that of the Gulf states, which makes them in some ways 
comparable to the figures for the other migrations mentioned. There are major 
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differences, however: Keralan migrants to the Gulf, who have fewer social and 
political rights than their counterparts in Europe or the USA, are more inclined 
to be temporary migrants rather than residents in the receiving country or dual 
residents (Willoughby 2006 in this issue).
In all the cases considered the numbers of migrants conceal the fact that 
from one year to another they are not necessarily the same people. There 
is much short-term as well as long-term migration, although, as Massey 
has argued in the case of Mexico, stricter enforcement at the border may 
discourage migrants from leaving the destination country once they arrive for 
fear of being unable to return later. Nonetheless the figures for the existing 
number of migrants is often considerably lower than the number of people who 
have spent a part of their lives living and working in the destination countries. 
Migration is, therefore, an experience which influences the society more than 
would appear from the aggregate figures alone. Massey (1998) reports that 
two thirds of Mexicans had a member of their extended family who had spent 
time in the USA. And Willoughby (2006 in this issue) reports that 38.5 per 
cent of households in Kerala have or have had one member who has migrated 
to the Gulf States. The case of Morocco is probably similar although I have not 
found an estimate.
3 . the characteriSticS of tranS-mediterranean migrantS
3 .1 . men and women
All the North African countries have a male majority in their populations 
except Morocco where there is a very small female majority (for more detail 
see Sutcliffe 2005). But, if there are women “missing” from the population as 
a whole, the bias is far greater in the emigrant population. It can be seen from 
Table 2 that for all the five North African nationalities women are a minority of 
the migrants. In the case of Morroccan immigrants women are about one third 
of the total in Spain, 36 per cent in Italy and a little over 40 per cent in France. 
Algerian women are an even lower percentage in Spain (where Algerians are 
much less numerous than Moroccans), and a similar percentage to Moroccan 
women in France. Roughly the same is true of Tunisian women, although there 
are very few Tunisians in Spain. For Libya and Egypt the information is very 
limited and migrant numbers in Europe are very small. The highest proportions 
of women in the Mahgrebi populations of Europe are in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, a fact which confirms that these are long-established, relatively 
settled communities which have expanded very little in recent years.
There are some small but telling differences between the different 
estimates. In the case of Moroccans in Spain the female minority is lowest in 
the estimates from the Padrón municipal which is believed to include many 
people without regular papers and permissions. In other words, as might be 
expected, a larger majority of irregular migrants than of regular migrants 
are men. In France the proportion of women is highest among those born 
the path of the Sea: human migration acroSS the weStern mediterranean
reviSta de economía mundial 14, 2006, 121-169
134
in North Africa who have acquired French citizenship. Again, as might be 
expected, the female/male ratio is higher for more established populations 
rather than recently arrived or unsettled migrants. If the percentage of women 
is thus considered an indicator of the permanence of the settlement, or of the 
maturity of the migration process, then the Maghrebian migration to France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands is seen to be much more established than that to 
Spain. More detailed indicators of these differences can be seen by comparing 
the population pyramids in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6.
A lower proportion of women in a migrant population leads to a natural and 
common interpretation. Male migrants are seen to be especially concentrated 
in certain age groups (15–40), often unmarried or at least unaccompanied 
by their wives and more likely to be temporary migrants. Female migrants 
tend not to be so concentrated in the 15–40 age groups, more likely to be 
married and more likely to be long-term settled migrants. The figures in Table 
2 confirm some of these stereotypes but they should still be interpreted with 
caution. It is possible both that some migration of men without female family 
members can be permanent and can represent a certain escape from family 
influence, that some women migrate independently of men, seeking work and 
also escaping family structures and power, and that households with male 
and female members are not necessarily permanent residents but may be as 
temporary as some individuals or single sex households.
taBle 2: female Share of north african migrant populationS in Spain, france and italy
Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt Maghreb 5 countries
Spain 1 a
33.3
(20–56)
24.0
(9–100)
32.5
(19–57)
Spain 2 b 34.1 22.1 28.2 20.0 33.2
Spain 3 c
35.8
(18–56)
21.8
(0–50)
29.0
34.6
(21–56)
Spain h 32.6 19.9
France 1 d 44.5 42.3 39.4 42.8
France 2 e 48.6 48.1 46.8 48.0
France 3 f 45.5 42.8 41.3 43.8
Italy g
38.0
(21–48)
25.1 
(11–100)
33.3
(17–75)
40.0
(0–100)
30.5
(0–48)
36.4 35.8
Belgium h 45.9 43.1
Netherlands h 52.0
Sources:
a. Padrón municipal by nationality.
b. 2003 Anuario de extranjería by nationality.
c. 2001 Census.
d. 1999 Recensement, Foreign born, foreign nationals.
e. 1999 Recensement, Foreign born, French nationality.
f. 1999 Census, Foreign nationals.
g. 2001 Censimento.
h. OECD/SOPEMI 2005, (2002 figures).
(numbers in parenthesis refer to the lower and upper limits by province (Spain) or provence (Italy)
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In the countries of the Mahgreb it is well known that there are much greater 
differences between male and female labour force participation rates than in 
the countries of Western Europe. The Mahgrebi figures can be clearly seen in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. In Morocco, for instance, 54.2 per cent of males 
participate in the labour force while only 18.7 per cent of women do so. What 
is more surprising to find is that, according to the estimates in Table 3 (taken 
from SOPEMI), the overall rate of labour force participation of immigrants in 
some Western European countries is actually lower than it is in the countries 
of origin. Participation of Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium is lower 
than in Morocco and in France it is only slightly higher; only Moroccans in Spain 
appear to have a considerably higher labour force participation rate than in their 
home country. This suggests that the older established Moroccan communities 
are not in this respect becoming more similar to the host communities; it may 
even be the opposite although no detailed figures about participation jointly 
by sex and age group are available to clarify this.
 
taBle 3: indicatorS of participation in the paid laBour force (per cent of population)
Countries of ORIGIN 
and Destination 1.Total 2. Male 3.Female
4.Women as % of workers 
from home country
ALGERIA
Spain
France
Belgium
27.4
54.7
41.5
23.6
47.0 7.2 9.1
MOROCCO
Spain
Netherlands
France
Belgium
36.4
52.4
33.8
39.6
33.5
54.2 18.7 15.5
36.4
30.5
19.0
TUNISIA
France
35.0
54.7 51.8 18.0 27.3
Source: OECD/SOPEMI 2005; ILO Laborsta 2005.
Note: the rows labelled by countries of origin show the figures for labour force participation in the 
country of origin (participants as a percentage of total population); the rows labelled by countries 
of destination show the same figure for the immigrant population from the indicated country. For 
instance, the overall participation rate of Moroccans in Spain is 52.4 per cent compared with 36.4 
per cent in Morocco.
Some of the literature has suggested that as migration proceeds the number 
of women migrants has risen relative to men. This would result from progressive 
family reunion but could also be the result of more women migrating on their 
own account to seek work or escape from family oppression. There seem to 
be no data to test the second of these possibilities; Column 4 of Table 3 shows 
recent figures for the number of women workers as a percentage of all workers 
but no comparative data are available for previous dates. It is curious to note 
that, in the case of Moroccan immigrants, the Netherlands and Belgium show 
similar low rates of overall participation but in the former country there are 
relatively far more Moroccan women working than in the second. This is an 
anomaly on which other figures appear to shed no light. During the 1990s 
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the proportion of women among Moroccan workers in Spain rose from under 
15 to nearly 18 per cent (Khaldi 2003, 200) but there is also some evidence 
that in recent years the proportion of women residents among Moroccans in 
Spain has declined, but that a growing proportion of them are married (López 
García 2005, 34, 36).
3 .2 . age and Sex
Another approach to ascertaining the social and demographic nature of 
Mahgrebi immigrant communities in Western Europe is to look at the age and 
sex breakdown in censuses and other general counts of the population. This 
is done in a series of sex–age pyramids (Figures 3, 4, and 5) which give a 
picture of the recent evolution of demographic structures of countries of origin 
and countries of destination and the most recent evidence about them from 
differing sources. 
The first thing which stands out clearly from these pyramids is the way 
in which parallel demographic changes (greater life expectancy and declining 
fertility) have transformed the age structure of both the Spanish and Moroccan 
populations during the last 40 years so that the structure is much more similar 
now than it was then, and will probably converge further in the future (Figures 
3a, b, c and d). The differences which remain, however, have some effect on 
migration patterns and will be mentioned later in this article. Here, as part of the 
attempt to identify who are the migrants, much can be learned by comparing 
the age and sex structure of the population of Morocco and of Moroccan 
emigrants. Comparing pyramids 3d with 5b, shows that it is men between 20 
and 45 who are the most over-represented group among emigrants, attesting 
to the importance of manual labour, especially in agriculture and construction, 
as sources of employment for immigrants in Spain. As with the figures in Table 
2, the Padrón municipal shows that the disproportionate number of men 
between 20 and 40 years of age is greater than that shown by figures for 
permitted migrants; in other words a considerable numbers of these may be 
immigrants without permits. 
The same age and sex structure now seen in Spain was probably also 
characteristic of Maghrebi immigration in France some decades ago; it has 
now changed so that, while there is still an over-representation of men, it is 
much less, and is concentrated in an older age group (those who migrated as 
young men and have remained in France) (Figures 4a and b). But the tendency 
towards more settlement and permanent residence also exists in Spain. This 
shows up in a striking difference between pyramid 3d (the Moroccan population 
in 2002) and 5b (Moroccans in Spain) in respect of the three lowest age groups 
(children up to 15 years old). In Morocco each of the three five-year groups 
is smaller than the one above it (indicating declining fertility) while among 
Moroccans in Spain the relation is the opposite, indicating not rising fertility 
among emigrants but rising tendencies not to leave children in the country of 
origin and to have children in the country of emigration. Among Moroccans in 
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Spain the share of children under 5 in the population is now almost as high as 
it is in Morocco.
figureS 3a, B, c, d: population pyramidS for Spain and morocco – changeS over 20 yearS
b. Morocco, 1982
d. Morocco, 2002
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Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook.
figureS 4 a, B: population pyramidS of mahgreBi nationalS in Spain and france
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figureS 5 a, B: population pyramidS of foreignerS and moroccanS in Spain according to the 
padrón municipal 2005
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Source: Spain, Padrón Municipal 2005.
3 .3 . education, occupation and claSS
If the number of Mahgrebi migrants is difficult to estimate, their skill and 
educational level is even more so. The sources available are either census or 
similar enumerations in the destination countries or sample studies in the 
countries of origin. Recent literature arrives at widely differing conclusions 
about the educational level of migrants from Morocco. A widely quoted 
World Bank research paper studying 24 labour exporting countries (including 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) concludes that “with respect to legal migration, 
international migration involves the movement of the educated” (Adams 2003, 
p. 2). This conclusion, arrived at using “a new data set based on OECD and US 
sources” claims that about 64 per cent of Moroccan and Tunisian migrants 
to OECD countries aged over 25 have completed tertiary education; it turns 
out, however, that this figure applies to immigration to the USA (which is 
not very large in volume) and it is then applied without qualification to all 
OECD countries. The document cited by the author for his figures (Trends in 
International Migration) is fact gives a very different picture of the percentage 
of “highly skilled” immigrants. The most recent issue provides the following 
figures for skill level in 2004:
Country Number of expatriates Per cent highly skilled
Algeria 1,302,076 16.4
Egypt 274,833 51.2
Morocco 1,364,754 14.8
Tunisia 371,274 17.7
Source: OECD/SOPEMI 2005, Table II A2.6.
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Other writers have also argued that migration of the highly skilled is 
important in Morocco. Collyer, while arguing that Egyptian emigration has 
been of more highly educated people than Moroccan, nonetheless concludes, 
without offering any figures, that in Morocco “the training and qualifications of 
emigrants have gradually increased over the past few decades. Even amongst 
clandestine migrants the level of education is typically extremely high.” (Collyer, 
2004, p. 29). Lopez Garcia agrees:
“De un lado, se ha elevado el nivel de instrucción entre las nuevas 
generaciones y una buena parte de los que emigran son personas que cursan 
estudios de segunda enseñanza, de bachillerato o de Universidad. También 
no son pocos licenciados en paro los que emigran, de ambos sexos ” (Lopez 
García 2005, 83).
On the other hand, in supposedly representative samples of Moroccans 
surveyed in research on the forces causing migration from Morocco by Heering, 
van der Erf and colleagues the educational breakdown of subjects was over 70 
per cent with no education, 14–20 per cent with primary education, 7 per 
cent with secondary education and less than 4 per cent with tertiary education 
(van der Erf and Heering 2002, Heering et al . 2004). It was found, however, 
that among migrants actually in Spain the number with primary or secondary 
education complete was higher than these figures but only 5 per cent of men 
and 2 per cent of women had tertiary qualifications. Despite this difference 
between those in Morocco and those in Spain, another study has concluded 
that in the case of Morocco (unlike Egypt, for example) there is negative self-
selection in relation to education levels: in other words the less educated of the 
sample are especially prone to emigrate (van Dalen et al . 2003). 
In the year 2000 the Spanish Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 
counted as skilled workers less than 13 per cent of the total of Moroccans with 
work permits, three times the percentage in 1990 but still relatively low (Khaldi 
2003, 199). Another recent survey of Morccan emigrration states that “the 
majority of migrants are unskilled with low levels of education” (Gallina 2004, 
17), but again there are no numbers.
At present it seems that good data on the qualifications of migrants is more 
elusive than on their overall numbers. It is important, as several writers stress, 
to fight against outdated, and perhaps always false, stereotypes of North 
African emigrants as uneducated and unskilled; but it is also important to resist 
an alternative fantasy that they are nearly all university graduates. There is a 
clear need here for more research on a question which is imporant both in 
itself and for what it indicates about the way immigrants are assimilated to the 
labour markets of countries of destination, and about the disadvantages and 
discrimination which they suffer.
The income and social status of migrants in their country of destination will 
depend on their employment, their receipt of social benefits in money and in 
kind and on other income sources. Skills and education must have a strong 
influence but so do other factors, especially discrimination. This obviously 
exists when groups with high qualifications have low socio-economic status 
but if the group’s qualifications are not high that does not mean that there is 
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no discrimination. Some interesting recent research on the causes of migration 
uses the International Socio-Economic Index, to compare the occupation status 
of immigrants from different countries of origin in 18 different countries of 
destination in Europe. Only Morocco of the North African countries has separate 
figures. But they are enough to show that Moroccan immigrants on average 
occupy a very low position in occupation status in Europe compared with other 
nationalities. Table 4 shows the relative levels for natives, all immigrants, and 
immigrants from Morocco for first male and then female workers.
taBle 4: relative occupational StatuS (meaSured in termS of the international Socio-economic 
index (iSei)), male and female, nativeS and immigrantS, 4 eu countrieS
Origin Destination Natives All immigants Morocco Turkey
MEN
Belgium 45.0 42.6 35.9 34.9
France 42.9 37.2 34.0 31.8
Netherlands 49.0 44.8 36.8 36.4
Spain 40.5 39.5 28.2 na
WOMEN
Belgium 45.6 44.0 33.9 32.5
France 42.4 34.1 28.9 33.2
Netherlands 46.8 44.1 na 34.8
Spain 42.0 37.9 23.2 na
Source: van Turbergen 2004.
taBle 5: Socio-profeSSional StatuS of mahgreBi immigrantS in france, 1999 (per cent)
Nationality
Socio-professional status
Algeria Morocco Tunisia Mahgreb Total France
Self-employed 3.0 2.3 3.6 2.8 3.6
Professional/managerial 5.0 3.2 4.3 4.1 12.9
Technical and skilled workers 21.0 16.0 20.4 18.6 20.2
Personal service 5.1 4.3 4.8 4.7 2.8
Unskilled workers 10.9 13.8 11.4 12.3 5.0
Retired 14.8 5.0 5.6 9.2 18.1
Unemployed, never worked 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.7 0.6
Inactive 37.1 52.9 47.6 45.5 36.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: France, Recensement 1999.
Table 5 (with data for Mahgrebi immigrants in France alone) is more difficult 
to interpret as an indicator of status or class since the categories are not in any 
clear hierarchy (and are in any case reduced from more numerous categories). 
But again it draws attention to the very low levels of economic activity among 
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Mahgrebi (and particularly Moroccan) immigrants. The French census data 
is in this respect roughly consistent with the ILO’s estimate of participation 
already reported in Table 3, although the ILO suggests even lower levels of 
participation. In any case, participation is much lower among populations of 
Mahgrebi origin than among immigrants as a whole or the whole population, 
despite the fact that the number women (expected to have a low rate of 
participation) is especially low.
Summarizing these figures for Mahgrebi residents as a whole, a little under 
12 per cent were skilled workers, a little more than 12 per cent unskilled and 
agricultural workers; 13.6 per cent were employees at various levels, nearly 5 
per cent were in personal service and 2.7 were unemployed who have never 
worked; the remaining 54.3 per cent were not economically active (9.2 per 
cent former workers and 45.5 per cent for other reasons). The Fondation 
Hassan II study provides evidence that Moroccan populations in Europe, in 
addition to having low economic participation rates, also suffer exceptionally 
high unemployment among the economically active. The unemployment rate 
of Moroccans was 24.5 per cent in the Netherlands (1996–98), 30.8 per cent 
in France (1999) and 42.5 per cent in Belgium (1998) (see El Bardaï 2003, 
Athane 2003 and Attar 2003).
Data from the Spanish Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales classifies 
about 13 per cent of Moroccan workers in the country as skilled. Unskilled 
workers in agriculture, construction and manufacturing constitute 58 per 
cent while the remaining 30 per cent are domestic workers, street traders or 
unclassified (Khaldi 2003, 196).
The evidence about the social and economic status of Mahgrebi 
communities is very incomplete. But, taken as a whole, it does not suggest 
in general high levels of economic prosperity. Very few are in highly paid jobs 
and professions and there is an exceptionally high dependency ratio, due both 
to low participation levels and high unemployment. This suggests something 
about the motivation for migration which will be examined later.
3 .4 . geographical originS and deStination
Disaggregating the number of migrants by age and sex has shown that 
North African migration to Western Europe is a very much less homogeneous 
phenomenon than it looks at first sight. The same is true of disaggregating by 
place – where the emigrants go to and where they come from. 
Figure 6 shows the heterogeneous distribution of Mahgrebi communities 
in Western Europe. Two tendencies are visible: the first is the concentration 
in and around large cities, such as Paris, Lyons, Marseille and Brussels; the 
second is the high numbers in areas of large scale agricultural and horticultural 
employment such as Girona and Valencia and some of the northern provinces of 
Italy. There is also a tendency, more influenced by ease of travel, for Mahgrebis 
to be concentrated in provinces along the Mediterranean shore. In France and 
Spain in particular there are still very few Mahgrebi residents in the north-
eastern provinces. Those in Belgium, the Netherlands and north-east France 
are, however, an exception to this.
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The net result of this disaggregation is to highlight the great variability in the 
phenomenon of migration from the standpoint of the country of destination. In 
fact “country” of destination is in some ways an inappropriate unit of analysis 
when Mahgrebis constitute more than 5 per cent of the population of 8 of 
France’s départements (and about one third of the foreign population of the Ile-
de-France) and less than one per cent in another 30; or where Moroccans alone 
form more than 5 per cent of the population of Europe’s capital, Brussels, but 
only 0.8 per cent of the population of the rest of Belgium (France Recensement 
1999; Attar 2003, 102).
figure 6: map Showing the percentage of mahgreBi immigrantS in the provinicial population of 
Belgium, netherlandS, france, Spain and italy, By nutS3 region, recent date
> 5
4–5
3–4
2–3
1–2
<1
Ceuta Melilla
France
Spain
Italy
Belgium
Netherlands
Note: For France and Italy the figures are for Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians together;
for Spain Moroccans and Algerians and for Belgium and the Netherlands Moroccans only.
The numbers of Algerian and Tunisian immigrants in countries where they are omitted are
not large enough to make any difference to the map.
Whole countries NUTS3 regions
Sources: Author’s calculations based on Spain: Padrón municipal 2005, France: Recensement 
1999, Belgium and Netherlands: Fondation Hassan II 2003, Italy: Censimento 2001.
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figure 7: over- and under-repreSentation of prefectureS of origin among morrocan reSidentS in 
Spain (2002) compared with Belgium (1995)
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< 0.1
no data
Territory to the south of this line is
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,
a full member of the African Union and
recognized by 48 states.
Out-migration rate of prefecture
as multiple of national rate:
Source: Author’s calculations using material in López García and Berriane 2004; for Belgium Reniers 
1999.
Note: the statistic mapped is the share of the (Moroccan) prefectural population resident in Spain 
(Belgium) as a multiple of the national figure.
The geographical heterogeneity of the pattern of migration is just as great 
when viewed from the standpoint of the country of origin. Thanks to the 
information contained in the most recent edition of the Atlas of migration from 
Morocco to Spain it is possible to assign the emigrant population to whichever 
of Morocco’s 71 prefectures they come from.
The authors of the Atlas, on the basis of a detailed questionaire, assigned 
a total of 176,681 Moroccan residents in Spain to their prefecture of origin, 
although incompleteness of the data means that some prefectures have to 
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be amalgamated. These data are for the year 2002. At that time the Spanish 
government’s estimate of the resident Moroccan population (with residence 
permits) was 298,275 (MTAS Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería 2002, 
published 2003) so the authors have managed to secure data from a very 
large sample of resident Moroccans; there is no reason to suppose that their 
large sample is biased with regard to place of origin. The Moroccan prefectures 
can be ordered according to a simple index of migration propensity (share 
of resident Moroccans in Spain from a province divided by the share of the 
Moroccan population in that prefecture). The value of the index, therefore, 
represents the ratio of the prefecture’s migration propensity to that of the 
whole nation. I have used this form of the index to make the results comparable 
to a calculation done by Reniers (1999) for Moroccans in Belgium. My results 
for Moroccan migrants resident in Spain can be seen in Figure 7 and compared 
to Reniers’ results (copied in an inset to the same figure).
The first impression given by the map for the prefectural origins of 
Morrocan residents in Spain is the enormous range between different areas 
of the country. The highest migration propensity (Jerada in Oriental province, 
with a value of 9.0 times the national average) is 211 times as high as in the 
lowest prefecture (Assa-Zag in Guelmim – Es-Semara province) with a value of 
one fortieth of the national average). The second clear message of the map 
is that the prefectures on the Mediterranean coast are more likely sources 
of migrants to Spain than any other areas of Morocco. Third, if the two maps 
are compared there is a striking similarity between them. The provinces which 
had the greatest propensity to produce Moroccan residents in Belgium in the 
1990s were by and large the same ones which had the greatest propensity to 
produce Moroccan residents in Spain a decade later. 
Would a similar pattern of geographical concentration be found in other 
destinations? In the case of Germany, the residence of a relatively small 
number of Moroccans, the pattern is even more biased towards migrants from 
the North than in Spain or Belgium. The prefecture of Nador was the original 
home of three quarters of the Moroccans in Germany in 1975; by 1993 this 
percentage had fallen but was still over 40 per cent while that prefecture 
houses only 2.4 per cent of the Moroccan population (Berriane 2003, 34). 
For other countries, I have not been able to discover how much the pattern 
is repeated; as far as I am aware, no present-day surveys exist for France, the 
Netherlands and Italy, the other major destinations, although one study in the 
Netherlands finds that “85 per cent of the Moroccan immigrants come from 
the Northern Riff Mountains” (van Heelsum 2003). There are some reasons 
why there may be differences. Some of the networks which have produced the 
modern pattern of migration to Spain may have been forged during the colonial 
period when the northern provinces which show such high propensities were 
under Spanish rule. The central and southern provinces were under French rule 
until 1956. During the migrations of the 1960s and early 1970s, “whereas for 
other regions of Morocco, France took in three-quarters of the emigrants, it 
received only one-third of the Berber emigrants from the north” (Reniers 1999, 
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685, referring to Bossard 1979). It is possible that this pattern remains true in 
France but sufficiently detailed information is not to my knowledge available.
If we compare the figures given for two dates in the Atlas we can see than the 
strong regional differences in the pattern of Moroccan migration to Spain have 
abated a little in the last decade. Figure 8 compares the migration intensity 
of Moroccan provinces (as shown in Figure 8) to the percentage increase in 
the number of emigrants between 1991 and 2001; each point represents 
one Moroccan prefecture. It can be seen that the largest increases were from 
prefectures of relatively low migration intensity; and that none of the provinces 
of highest migration intensity were among those with the fastest growth. 
But there was no sea change: many of the prefectures with highest growth 
represented relatively small absolute numbers. The pattern of migration to 
Spain, along with Italy the fastest growing destination for Moroccan migrants, 
remains regionally very unequal. In one sense, therefore, migration from the 
Moroccan prefectures of Jerada, Nador or Larache to the Spanish provinces 
or Girona and Tarragona is a more real phenomenon that migration from 
Morocco to Spain, and certainly much more real than the almost non-existent 
phenomenon of migration from the Moroccan prefectures of El Jadida or Asa-
zag to the Spanish provinces of Avila or Zamora. In another sense, however, they 
are all the same since between Jerada and Girona, just as between El Jadida 
and Avila lies the same institutional frontier – the Spain–Morocco border.
figure 8: changeS in morocco-Spain migration By prefecture, 1991-2001
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Source: Author´s calculations based on data in López García and Berriane 2005.
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4 . the flow of money and the flow of people, BankS and ferrieS
4 .1 . remittanceS in aggregate
Much of the recent discussion of North African, and particularly Moroccan, 
migration to Europe has emphasized the role of remittances. Figure 9 shows 
the estimates made by the World Bank of migrants’ remittances since 1975 for 
the three Mahgrebi countries and for Egypt. Both Morocco and Egypt receive 
large quantities of remittances in total (Fig. 9a) but in Morocco and Tunisia they 
are much more important in relation to the population (Figure 9e); in these 
two countries remittances amount to about $120 per annum per inhabitant. 
Egypt’s erratically moving remittances are in decline, reflecting the economic 
situation of the Gulf region as the main destination of Egyptian migrants. In 
Morocco and Tunisia, however, remittances are still rising in importance both 
absolutely and in relation to national income, exports and development aid 
(Figures 9a, b, c, d). For Algeria no reliable data on remittances exists since 
1991.
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figure 9, a, B, c, d and e: meaSureS of migrantS’ remittanceS and their importance
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005 .
Moroccan national data allows a more detailed analysis of the flow of 
remittances. In Figure 10 the dashed and continuous lines show the strong rise 
of aggregate remittances in dirhams and dollars respectively and against the 
right and left axes respectively.
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figure 10: morocco: total remittanceS 1980–2003 (millionS of dirhamS/dollarS)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
current dirhams
dirhams 1980 prices
current dollars
Left axis: Right axis:
Sources: WDI 2004 (dollars); Maroc, Office des Changes (dirhams). (http://www.oc.gov.mar/MRE_
annees.htm)
The evolution of total remittances in current dollars and current dirhams is 
similar, confirming that the original source is the same (the Moroccan Office 
des Changes) and showing the relative stability of the exchange rate since the 
mid-1980s. And they have risen steeply. Deflating the total by changes in the 
Moroccan retail price index shows, however, that in real terms it has not risen 
so much; it has hardly doubled in 23 years. This means that it has grown more 
slowly than the number of emigrants, so real remittances per emigrant have 
been falling, although they have risen per inhabitant of Morocco, growing much 
faster than the total population (2.4 times compared with 1.6 times). A more 
detailed breakdown of the evolution of remittances per head is given later. 
While the importance of migrants’ remittances is increasingly emphasised 
in the development literature, and while Morocco is one of the half dozen 
countries for which remittances are most important, it is clear that they are no 
magic potion.
The prevailing opinions about remittances have followed to some extent the 
prevailing opinions about migration. To begin with the development and related 
literature mostly ignored the issue and then began to produce occasional 
pieces of work which were markedly hostile to migration, being based on the 
firm traditional idea that development meant betterment for people in the 
places (or at least the countries) where they lived. It was not until millions of 
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migrants from developing countries, in the absence of adequate development, 
took matters into their own hands by emigrating that social scientists began to 
take a more favourable view of migration as a means to individual and perhaps 
even community betterment. And, more recently, especially in the last 5 years 
a sharp new about turn has taken place and migration is being opposed, not 
only be governments but by social scientists with a range of political positions. 
Two ideas about remittances became conventional as part of the early hostility 
to migration: first, that they were not very significant in size and would in any 
case tend to wane rapidly as migrants settled into their new communities 
(see Garson and Tapinos 1981); and second that they tended to be spent 
on consumption which was deemed to do no good for development, possibly 
increase inequalities and to be actually bad for development by causing 
inflation. More recently, the tide of prevailing opinion turned again. By 2004 
the World Bank devoted a large part of its annual Global Development Finance 
to extolling the importance of remittances, emphasizing their role in financing 
foreign exchange deficits and arguing that means must be found by which they 
could be mobilized for development purposes. Other writers have stressed the 
positive effects of remittances on the incomes of poor households. Adams and 
Page (2003) found that they played a major role in poverty reduction. But 
not surprisingly, there is already a backlash to this. In particular, Chami et al . 
(2005) at the IMF (using panel data from 113 countries) strongly conclude that 
there is a negative correlation between remittances and economic growth and 
therefore argue that remittances are counter-cyclical payments to maintain 
household consumption in bad periods but that they are not a plausible 
source of capital for development (as the World Bank seemed to have been 
suggesting).
Jacques Bouhga-Hagbe (2004), like Chami et al ., finds that changes in 
remittances and changes in Moroccan GDP are negatively related. These 
findings, however, are not consistent with the published figures for remittances 
and Moroccan GDP usually published (from the Office des Change and World 
Development Indicators). Using those figures the relationship appears as in 
Figure 11. The correlation coefficient of these two series is 0.0 (or 0.2 if a 
one-year lag is introduced). There is not much evidence here of a tendency for 
migrants to compensate for fluctuations in the Moroccan economic situation. 
Bouhga-Hagbe also finds, more plausibly,  that remittances are closely related 
to French wage rates (a proxy for the income of Moroccan emigrants) and 
to activity in the Moroccan construction industry (which is often financed by 
emigrants’ transfers).
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figure 11: morocco: relation Between percentage change in remittanceS and gdp, 1980–2003 
(each point repreSentS one year)
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As to the contribution of remittances to development in Morocco, different 
studies have arrived at contrasting conclusions. All stress that a major portion of 
remittances is used to supplement basic consumption. Bourchachen concludes 
that because of this 1.2 million Moroccans escape poverty thanks to remittances 
(Bourchachen 2000). Others stress that remittances have increased inequality. 
In some places they have become a substitute for maintaining and improving 
agricultural production (Leichtman 2000) but in other places they have been 
invested in agricultural improvement (Haas 1998). Many studies highlight the 
tendency to spend remittances on building and improving homes. Migrants 
from rural areas often use remittances to build or buy houses in the city. Many 
have used foreign savings to set up small businesses, especially in the service 
sector. All of these studies may capture part of the truth about remittances, 
but the whole truth remains elusive3. The inconclusiveness is part of what 
Collyer rightly describes as “the overwhelming difficulty of saying anything 
comprehensive about the relationship between migration and development, 
such is the complexity of the interactions and the multiplicity of variables 
involved” (Collyer 2004). One of the problems of the debate, however, is that 
it judges the achievement of something which its protagonists do not intend to 
achieve. There may be a few eccentrics who migrate in order to help develop 
their country. The vast majority, however, migrate for reasons to do with their 
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own and their families’ welfare, in a broad sense of that word. Most of the 
debate about migration and development, however, focusses on its effect on 
the development of countries of origin or on its economic and social impacts on 
the countries of destination (and often specifically on their existing residents). 
Too little of the discussion centres on the needs of the migrants themselves 
who are frequently simply left out of the equation.
4 .2 . remittanceS per emigrant
The amount of money remitted by emigrants to their families in countries 
of origin depend obviously on the number of migrants and on the amount 
each one transmits. The detailed data published by the Moroccan Office des 
Changes shows aggregate remittances by country of emigration. If these are 
combined with the estimates of the relative size of the Moroccan community 
by country of destination, outlined in Figure 2, then it is possible to see how 
much the number of migrants and the amount of remittances coincide. Table 6 
shows the variations in the implicit remittance propensity of different Moroccan 
emigrant communities.
taBle 6: relation Between diStriBution of moroccan migrantS and diStriBution of their remittanceS 
By country (europe 5)
Migrants
(thousands)
Remittances
(million dirhams)
per cent of migrants remittances %
Spain 569 3188.6 25.4 11.8
France 820 15385.0 36.7 56.9
Belgium 233 2062.4 10.4 7.6
Netherlands 273 2031.9 12.2 7.5
Italy 341 4379.7 15.2 16.2
Total 2,236 27047.6 100 100
Sources: See Table 1 and Maroc, Office des Changes 2005.
There is less correspondence between the percentage of migrants and 
the percentage of remittances in this table than has been remarked by other 
researchers. In particular Moroccan migrants in France seem to be considerably 
more inclined to send remittances than those in Spain. This may partly be an 
illusion since the figure for migrants in Spain is for a more recent date than for 
France. More recent figures would eliminate a part of the difference, but not all 
of it. There may be other reasons for different rates of remittance from different 
communities. The low rate in the Netherlands might be seen as the result of 
the longer established nature of the Moroccan community there. But this is 
unlikely since the rate is higher from Belgium and much higher for France, both 
of them with long-established communities. One would nevertheless expect 
the Moroccans in Spain, the newest overseas Moroccan community, to have a 
high rate of remittance. The fact that it is particularly low may be due to various 
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causes. It may be that Moroccans in Spain have lower rates of pay than those 
in France. That is probable given the rapid expansion of immigration to Spain 
in recent years and to the fact that quite a high proportion of the immigrants 
has been in very low paid jobs and especially exploitable. But the other side of 
this is that the male majority among Moroccans in Spain is much higher than 
in France which suggests that labour force participation rates (and so numbers 
of wage earners, if not wages) may be greater.
These figures are shown in Table 6 for the latest year. In addition, the 
Office des Changes also publishes an annual series since 1982, attributing 
total remittances by the country from which they came. This can be compared 
to the estimates of changes in the Moroccan emigrant population shown in 
Figure 2 to give a very rough estimate of changes in the amount remitted per 
emigrant. This is shown in Figure 12 adjusted for inflation (deflated by the 
Moroccan price index).
In 2003 total reported remittances reported were about $3.6 billion, about 
$120 per head of the population. But it is not, of course, distributed equally 
either territorially or in any other way. If we assume that the remittances are 
distributed by province in about equal proportion to the provincial origin of 
Moroccan migrants in Spain, then in the province with the highest emigration 
propensity, Oriental in the North, would receive a little more that £1 billion of 
remittances with a population of 1.9 million. This would mean more than $600 
per head of population in a province whose income per head is calculated in 
US$ as $1241, in other words an increase of 50 per cent per person in GDI per 
head. This may be exaggerated since PPP income is estimated to be 3 times 
that calculated in exchange rate terms. Moreover, within Oriental province 
there are major differences between prefectures in migration propensity. In the 
prefecture of Jerada, a number equal to over 5 per cent of whose population 
is resident in Spain alone, the migration propensity is more than twice that of 
Oriental province. It would not be surprising if remittances there were larger 
than locally generated income.
This, however, is speculation. What is known is that overall levels of 
remittance from Europe have been maintained over a long period and from 
some countries of residence are rising not only as monetary aggregates but 
also in real terms per head. This itself is remarkable given the evidence about 
the economic situation of Moroccan emigrants in Europe – their low level of 
economic participation, low occupational status and high unemployment (see 
Section 3). But even the figures seen above are a significant underestimate 
of the amount remitted. This is because they omit both transfers which are 
not known to the monetary authorities (many of them being carried as cash) 
and non-monetary transfers. Remittances in kind are a central element in the 
relationship between Moroccans at home and abroad and they are crucially 
related to the movement of people.
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figure 12: eStimateS of remittanceS per emigrant, 1982–2003
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Source: as Figure 2 and Maroc, Office des Changes 2005.
4 .3 . paSo del eStrecho
Remittances in kind are almost impossible to estimate but casual observance 
of the phenomenon of the Paso de Estrecho is enough to show that they likely 
to be very important. And they may be relatively more important for those 
migrants who are resident closer to home. Photo 3 gives an impression of the 
volume of traffic and the remittances in kind characteristic of the Paso.
The continuous flow of people between Morocco and Europe is one of the 
distinguishing features of Moroccan migration. Every year, especially during 
the summer months, a high proportion of Moroccans resident in Europe return 
to their home country for stays of up to a few weeks. While use of airlines for 
this travel in increasing, the great majority of travellers go by road in cars, vans 
and small trucks, using one of the numerous ferry crossings. During the 1980s 
this annual flow of migrants began to overburden the infrastructure of Spain, 
the country through which most of them travelled. The problems prompted 
the building of new roads, rest and parking facilities, and port facilities at the 
embarcation ports and ferries. 
The crossing has come to be planned by the Spanish authorities as the 
equivalent of a military operation. It is grandiosely called “Operación Paso de 
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Estrecho” and lasts from June to September, in two phases Operación Salida 
and Operación Retorno. The Coordinador General of the Operación regularly 
reports, in ever more detailed and self-congratulatory annual reports, that it 
has been a great success, proudly claiming in the 2004 report that instead of 
people waiting for the boats, the boats now wait for the people. The involved 
2004 OPE 606,286 vehicles containing 2,525,138 passengers in 7,511 boat 
trips. 5,561 passengers were given medical assistance during their journey 
by the Spanish authorities. Another 5,103 received social assistance (which 
is often a euphemism for an inspection of documents)4. Most of the boats go 
from Algeciras at the Northern side of Hercules’s Gate and arrive at Ceuta or 
Tanger (Figure 13) and other ferries leave from ports further east.
Ferries from Algeciras to Ceuta and Tanger (the northern and southern 
points of the strait) leave at least every hour during the day and cost the foot 
passenger either 11 or 18 euros, depending on whether it is a fast (40 minutes) 
or slow (90 minutes) ferry. In the enclave of Ceuta you are still legally in Spain 
(one of two particles of the European Union which are in Africa) so to get to 
Morocco you have to cross the land border. It is a bit more expensive to take 
the Ferry Rápido, a catamaran from Tarifa to Tanger but you arrive directly in 
Morocco.
figure 13: ferry routeS acroSS the Strait of giBraltar
CeutaGibraltar
Algeciras
Tarifa
Tanger>
<Cadiz
Source: NASA.
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photo 2: ferrieS in the Strait of giBraltar
The Paso, however, is something which shows much of the uniqueness of the 
North African (and particularly the Moroccan) immigration to Europe. In the first 
place, the geographical closeness of the place of origin and place of residence 
of migrants, as well as the relative ease and cheapness of travel, means that 
few emigrants completely break their link with home. They are not emigrants in 
the sense that nineteenth century Europeans in America were emigrants. Their 
lives occupy an enormous space encompassing their home towns, possibly 
other places in Morocco en route, their place of work or residence in Europe 
and the transport facilities and infrastructure in between. Their living space 
occupies part of at least two and often more countries. Their normal annual 
lives involve several crossings of international frontiers. Secondly, the manner 
of the annual Paso has great material significance. In particular because most 
migrants returning for their summer break in Morocco arrive in a vehicle piled 
high with goods acquired in Europe to be left in Morocco (see photo 3).
photo 3: vehicleS, with remittanceS in kind, waiting to Board a tranS-mediterranean ferry
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photo 4: SpaniSh road Sign . even in northern Spain there are road SignS in araBic
5 . puSh, pull and Stop
Economists assume that the objective of migrants is to increase their 
economic welfare. The economics of migration began with an emphasis on the 
economic possibilities facing individuals regarding income and employment. 
Later it has been complicated in many ways. The concentration on individuals 
gave way to seeing the family as the decision making and optimizing unit (the 
so-called “new” economics of migration); this has been extended by ever more 
complex analyses of the family and the interrelations of it members. Others 
have seen migration as a form of escape from the family. These sophistications 
of the individual or the unified happy family model of migration have served to 
introduce a strong gender focus into the debate. In either case, the dimension 
is much more sociological than the early view of migration. The nature of the 
methodology of all this discussion can be summarized (and is sometimes 
explicitly known as) “push and pull” effects: in other words those economic and 
social forces which drive migrants to leave their countries of origin and those 
which attract them to their countries of destination. 
Added to this microeconomics (or micro-socioeconomics) of migration is 
a macro-economics of migration which examines the effects of migration on 
economic stability, growth and development, and particularly analyzes the 
impact of migrants’ monetary remittances to their home countries, viewed 
both from the point of view of their effect on development and from their 
significance as a monetary flow, sometimes large enough to affect rates of 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates.
To many observers neither the micro- nor the macro-economics of migration 
are enough to explain the actual patterns of migration prevalent in the world. A 
significant part of what drives actually existing migration does not seem to be 
captured by them. As a result attention has been increasingly concentrated on 
institutional aspects of migration, in particular the nature of the international 
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social networks which are an essential part of real world migration processes 
and which explain why the most travelled migratory routes are not those which 
the purely economic analysis of push and pull effects would predict, and which 
also explain the durability of migration patterns even when economic and 
social circumstances change in both origin and destination countries.
All these theoretical ideas, and empirical work based on them, are greatly 
expanding our knowledge of the nature of the processes of migration. But I 
contend that there are some aspects of existing methodology which do not 
aid understanding and which need to be reconsidered and revised. The most 
fundamental of these is the shared assumption that migration requires an 
explanation. There is a very strong tradition in social science to “explain” not 
what is regarded as normal but what is regarded as exceptional. In this field 
the standard view (sometimes as an unconsidered instinct, sometimes as a 
strongly held prescriptive opinion) is that migration is abnormal and needs 
to be explained, while spending one’s life in the community and place in 
which one was born is natural and needs no explanation. The social sciences 
are replete with such ideas: for instance there is an abundance of theories 
of homosexuality but hardly any of heterosexuality. The idea that migration 
is abnormal is no doubt influenced by the existence of a period of history 
from the end of World War I to the 1960s when at least non-forced migration 
was virtually forbidden, as well as by feelings of hostility towards immigrants 
which have built up in more recent years. This negative view of migration has a 
deep influence on the study of the phenomenon. Many analyses of migration 
are written with the implicit or stated objective of finding ways to reduce it. 
Indeed much contemporary migration research has been financed by public 
bodies in destination countries with exactly that idea in mind. But if we are 
interested primarily in the aspects of migration which can be reversed, then we 
will inevitably fail to see much about its nature.
A second common but also negative aspect of the study of migration is that 
it implicitly assumes that there are few legal or physical obstacles to migration. 
This is a natural result of the fact that early theories of international migration 
were extensions of prior theories of intra-national migration and therefore 
contained no consideration of the crossing of frontiers. But while goods and 
capital increasingly cross international frontiers with the same lack of difficulty 
as birds or butterflies, this is far from true for human beings. Crossing borders 
often requires documents, money and a great deal of daring. Since on the whole 
there is tendency to tighten frontier controls then increasingly the numbers 
and nature of migrations is influenced by the crossing of borders, in other 
words “stop” in addition to “push” and “pull”. The increasing concentration on 
networks as an influence on migration is in part a recognition of the problems of 
border crossing; one of the essential functions of many networks is to facilitate 
this difficult activity. It has been calculated that “the 25 richest countries are 
probably spending US$ 25–30 billion a year on immigration enforcement and 
asylum processing mechanisms” (Martin 2003), a similar order of magnitude 
to the amount transferred as overseas development aid. But there is very little 
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serious analysis in the literature of the extent to which border controls actually 
influence the quantity and kind of migration and the ability of migrants to gain 
their objectives.
This final part of the article discusses the relationship between some of 
these theoretical points and the empirical information about present-day 
Western Mediterranean migration outlined in the earlier parts. It is clear 
that powerful push and pull factors must have been at work to create the 
considerable population with Mahgrebi origins which is now resident in Europe. 
The comparison of some national averages gives a clear suggestion of the 
possible incentives. Average Western European material living standards have 
been considerably higher than those in the countries on the opposite side of 
the Mediterranean. 
In Figure 14, this gap (or step, as it is sometimes called) is measured as the 
ratio between the purchasing power parity level of income per head in certain 
European and certain North African countries. The gap is very wide indeed: 
5.6 for Spain/Morocco compared with 4.1 between the USA and Mexico, the 
same figure between Germany and Turkey and 4.6 between Saudi Arabia 
and India. Between 1985 the gap has grown between both France and Spain 
and Morocco and, as is well known, migration, especially to Spain, has also 
grown during this period. This difference in income levels seems an obvious 
element of any explanation of Mahgrebi citizens, let alone those from further 
south, taking the path of the sea. On the other hand, as has already been 
argued, Morocco (like most countries) is regionally heterogeneous, including 
in income levels. The national income per head of the most prosperous 
province is estimated to be 25 per cent higher than in the poorest province 
(UNDP Morocco 2003). It would be reasonable to expect that the incentive to 
emigrate from poor provinces was greater than from rich ones. In fact, however, 
regional disagreggation reveals no relationship whatever between provincial 
income and provincial migration intensity (see Figure 15). Of course, neither 
the national nor the provincial income gap across the Mediterranean is an 
incentive in itself; it depends on the expectations of the income which will be 
received in the country of destination. In this case we have seen that there 
is evidence that Mahgrebi immigrants in Europe are among the groups with 
lowest occupational and socio-economic status (see Section 3)5. It seems, 
therefore, that a large amount of migration has taken place even though the 
gap in incomes between Morocco and Moroccans in Spain or France is much 
less than the gap in GDP per head between both countries.
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figure 14: ratio of gdp per head in international dollarS Between north and South 
mediterranean countrieS, 1975–2003
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The incentive of income is, however, not independent of the probability of 
employment and the type of employment available. According to Moroccan 
government figures the rate of unemployment in Morocco in 2003 was 
about 12 per cent, although no informed observer believes that it is so low. 
Unemployment was highly concentrated in urban areas and among people 
aged between 15 and 34 years, the years of highest economic participation. 
The rate of unemployment both of men and of women between 15 and 24 in 
urban areas was even in official figures about one third. Since this is the age 
group which seems to be most represented in recent Moroccan migration, to 
Spain at least, it is reasonable to suppose that it has been a strong push factor. 
Nonetheless, once again when the figures are disaggregated by province, there 
is no statistical relationship between regional migration intensity and either 
the percentage of urban population, or the provincial unemployment rate, or 
the provincial rate of economic participation any more than there is with the 
relative level of regional income.
It appears, therefore, that the unequal regional pattern of Moroccan 
emigration almost certainly has other powerful determinants that are not to 
be found in obvious economic differences. This is not to say that labour market 
considerations do not play a part in explaining the flow of migrants. If they had 
stayed in Morocco it is reasonable to suppose that unemployment would have 
been much higher in that country. In any case the unemployment rate is probably 
underestimated, partly due to many forms of disguised unemployment and 
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partly because the very low level of economic participation is in part a reaction 
to the lack of employment opportunities. Emigration, however, does not seem 
to provide these opportunities since the rate of economic participation of 
expatriate Moroccan communities is not generally higher than that in Morocco 
itself. Government and international statistics estimate the overall level of 
participation at between 34 and 36 per cent of the population in Morocco 
(Maroc en Chiffres; UNDemographic Yearbook 2002). While it is much higher 
than this in Spain, it is even lower in Belgium and the Netherlands and not 
much higher in France (see Table 4). It also seems that a high proportion of 
the low numbers who are economically active can expect to be unemployed 
although many who are unemployed or inactive according to these definitions 
may be active in informal sector activities.
figure 15: relation of provincial and prefectural migration intenSity to variaBleS of reSidence, 
employment and participation, morocco 2003
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Note: scatters of three other variables (rural/urban residence, regional unemployment, and labour 
force participation rate) are just as uncorrelated with the regional rate of emigration to Spain.
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The facts that the large numbers of Moroccans in Western Europe live 
on average at the lower end of the European income distribution and with 
relatively low economic status and with very few if any steps towards such goals 
as increasing economic independence for women may make many wonder why 
it has been and continues to be a relatively popular option. Certainly it is hard 
to explain with reference either to the overall economic aggregates of income 
and employment, or by regionally disaggregating these.
There is, however, another picture. For a very large number of the emigrants 
life is not a question of living in Morocco or in Europe, but rather of living in 
both simultaneously6. Ruba Salih, in a study of Moroccan women migrants in 
Italy concludes:
“For some families, life “here” and life “there” become therefore 
complementary. For other Moroccan families, however, transnationalism 
may paradoxically involve mutually exclusive choices. Indeed, annual visits 
to Morocco imply sacrifices in Italy. These aspects are salient in Moroccan 
women’s narratives that often revolve around the tension embedded in 
managing the family’s budget. For many of them, transnationalism means 
struggling to distribute resources evenly between Italy and Morocco, 
satisfying children’s needs in Italy and relatives’ expectations in Morocco, 
operating a balance between the desire to display their success in 
Morocco and the concrete requirements of everyday life in Italy” (Salih 
2001, 669)”.
For many, especially those who propose to spend least time in Europe, 
even low paid employment or precarious informal sector activities, may, 
given an extremely frugal life style, provide resources for substantial transfers 
of remittances to those parts of the family who reside, at least for now, in 
Morocco. Many Moroccan families are particularly good examples of the 
growing phenomenon of the multinational family. They function economically 
by frequent redistribution of their members between family sites to take 
advantages even of small economic opportunities. They are vehicles for major 
flows of finance and transfers in kind from Western Europe to the country of 
origin. The network within which this still unorthodox social life operates are 
partly family ones and partly regional ones. Regular flows of migrants in both 
directions are often better understood as flows from one region (province or 
even village) to another, rather than one country to another. So in this sense 
too the simple traditional idea that society is a kind of Russian doll with the 
individual in the centre, enclosed in the family, enclosed by the town, province 
and country in turn is broken down. Many families break out of nations; 
their geographical boundaries may be larger than those of a whole country. 
In the words of Salih “transnationalism allows women to construct a ‘home’ 
which includes in a continuum both Italy and Morocco” (Salih 2001, 668). 
Migrant households and families evolve in this milieu. They develop new forms 
of cooperation, interconnection and complementarity of members. Some 
of them give new opportunities for independence and authority to those 
who were previously denied it (for example, women who, with male-biased 
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migration, become the majority in families or towns or countries where men 
have always been the majority). Within the same milieu new forms of authority 
and authoritarianism may also develop, as well as forms of escape from family 
interdependence into a new independence. Negotiating this great expansion 
of families and communities can be extremely difficult. It means finding ever 
new ways of selling labour power, or other ways of making a living, maintaining 
freedom in relation to two or more state powers, frequent, long and arduous 
journeys, dealing with harsh economic conditions and fluctuations of economic 
fortune, dealing with hostility and racism from established communities, with 
problems of language and cultural difference.
Some migrants succeed spectacularly in this experimental environment; 
and some fail altogether. But the great majority, as the data presented here 
on the stability in the number of migrants and the flow of remittances show, 
adapt, innovate and survive economically and culturally.
If migration can in some ways best be understood as migration from one 
family seat to another, or from one village, city or province to another, there 
is one aspect of it which can only be seen as migration from one national 
state to another and that is the problem of the frontier and how to cross it. 
Mahgrebi migrants to Europe have benefitted from a degree of freedom of 
movement which allows them to arrive legally in the first place and then to 
move back and forth between their two countries of residence. To do so they 
must cross frontiers and the degree of freedom to do so has become one of 
the central political issues of our age. The recent political history of almost 
every European country (and perhaps also the USA) shows that the degree 
of openness is probably the most divisive of all political issues. The overall 
trend of policies is to tighten the control of frontiers, something which creates 
problems both for new migrants and for multinational families. The latter find 
that states construct a fence of fluctuating height and crossability across their 
living space.
A country such as Spain has, almost inevitably, two policies towards its 
national frontiers, the most conflictive and permeable parts of which are the 
Strait of Gibraltar and the stretch of sea between Africa and the Canary Islands. 
It must maintain its openness because some of its employers demand cheap 
labour, or because its resident immigrants want the right to family reunion, or 
the freedom to visit their country of origin, or because it wishes to allow the flow 
of tourists in both directions and because to stop all these things completely 
would involve violating a hundred accepted codes of “civilized” behaviour. On 
the other hand, it needs to close its frontier because some of its people feel 
threatened by the competition or pressure of immigrants, because its allies 
press it to stop unwanted immigrants using the country as a pathway to other 
parts of Europe, or because it fears the growth of social conflict.
It is, therefore, like all European countries at the present time, mired in a 
deep contradiction. The imperfect solution, almost bound to fail, is to divide 
those who enter its territory into two rigidly distinct groups – those with and 
those without permits, the legals and the illegals, the “with papers” and the 
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“without papers”. No sooner had the present Spanish government accepted 
in 2005 that it had lost part of this battle and as a result legalized almost one 
million “illegal” residents, than it declared that that was the end. From now on 
there would be no more regularizations and the borders would be policed with 
total rigour, just as the US government had said in 1986 and is now saying 
again. The minister in charge of migration agreed with five other European 
governments to impose a new more rigid border control policy and to expel 
more illegal migrants in joint special charter flights to avoid the problem that 
regular airline passengers are becoming increasingly resistant to travelling with 
migrants who are being forcibly removed from Europe (Financial Times 2005; 
El País 2005; The Guardian 2005).
Contradictory though it is, there is no doubt that the Spanish and other 
European governments are very serious in their intention to tighten the 
borders. One step towards this objective was the construction in 1999 of a new 
perimeter fence in the “barbed-wire baroque” style along the border between 
the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and Morocco (see Figure 16). This has closed the 
porousness of part of the border but, despite all the expense, it seems almost 
laughable when hundreds of thousands of Moroccans and others cross this 
border legally every year and when the rest of the border is long and ill-defined, 
consisting of the beaches of northern Morocco and southern Spain and the sea 
between them. The forbidding Ceuta fence is an exemplary rather than a real 
frontier (see Erdem 2006 in this issue for a parallel case in Turkey).
figure 16: the ceuta fence (perímetro fronterizo) 
Source: El País, 17.08.1999.
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Passengers who cross the Strait legally do so in modern and comfortable 
ferries, the trip is short and usually pleasant and safe and, aside from some 
occasional bureaucratic trouble at the frontiers, it is not a difficult passage – as 
long as you have the requisite papers (passport, national identity document, 
visa, work permit as appropriate).
If you do not have these documents there are alternative crossings. For a 
price, false documents can be purchased or legal documents may be borrowed 
from someone who is not currently using them. Otherwise, along the coast 
between the southern Gate and Tanger, or further south along the coast of the 
Western Sahara, you need to find the owner of a patera (a small and often not 
very stable boat; see Photo 6). To carry you (along with an excessive number 
of other passengers) during the night, avoiding if possible the controls of the 
Spanish authorities, he was charging in 1998 about €1000 (by now probably 
about €2000).
photo 5: detail of the ceuta fence
Source:Website of Centre for International Borders Research, Queen’s Univesity, Belfast (http://www.
qub.ac.uk/cibr/PGStudies01.htm).
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The Spanish authorities have devoted increasing resources (largely from 
the Guardia Civil) to intercepting the patera traffic. In 2002 they established 
the SIVE (Inregrated System of External Vigilance), an elaborate network of 
radar, cameras, land and sea platforms and helicopter stations along the 
southern Spanish coast, to stop illegal immigrants arriving by sea. Initially this 
was expected to cost about 1.5 billion euros. In the years 2003 and 2004 
they intercepted 942 and 740 boats respectively, and detained 19.2 and 15.7 
thousand occupants and 225 and 283 patera owners or organizers. 13 and 
14 boats were wrecked and 101 and 81 bodies were found; another 109 and 
60 people disappeared while 406 and 339 were rescued. These detentions 
were distributed about half and half between the Canary Islands (about 200 
km. from the Moroccan coast at the shortest point) and the Strait of Gibraltar. 
(Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2005) Official figures for 2005 
showed a 25 per cent fall in the number of immigrants arriving in pateras since, 
the authorities claim, thanks to the SIVE, more pateras are being intercepted 
before they reach the shore. Nonetheless, the early part of 2006 saw a new 
increase in the number of pateras leaving the Mauritanian coast and bringing 
larger numbers of immigrants from West and Central Africa to the Canary 
Islands. The government of Mauritania (where the press claimed that 1 million 
migrants were waiting to embark) declared itself unable to curtail the flow; it 
was offered help by the Spanish government which in turn appealed from help 
from the rest of Europe. This new route is longer and riskier and wil no doubt 
result in more shipwrecks and deaths.
photo 6: landing from a patera on the SpaniSh coaSt
Many of those who go missing in the Strait or off the north-west African 
coast are never accounted for in figures and the total number of those who die 
annually must be substantially more than those reported. The deaths, though 
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not directly willed by the authorities, are an inescapable and necessary part 
of the policy of deterrence of illegal immigrants. Well publicised shipwrecks, 
arrests and drownings are, like the fence, part of the policy of demonstrating 
that the frontier, open to millions of people, is firmly closed to those who 
have not been selected. The Strait of Gibraltar, like the Rio Grande in the 
case of the USA, confronts Europe with a Herculean quandary: can freedom 
and democracy within the continent be consistent with draconian control at 
the borders? Or will the tightening of frontiers be obtained by restricting the 
freedom and democracy of all?
The Gates of Hercules remain a place of historic drama because, as well 
as being the unconsummated kiss between continents, it is a consummate 
frontier between two nation states, Morocco and Spain. Pedro Duque (Spain’s 
first astronaut) remarked during his maiden space flight that “from up here you 
can’t see any frontiers”. The crossing of the strait (Paso del Estrecho), however, 
in some ways like the Mexico–USA border, has become a microcosm of the 
interrelations between North and South in the world, in particular between 
Europe and Africa, and even more in particular between Spain and Morocco, 
as well as a vortex in the struggle between different concepts of development, 
globalization and human rights.
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